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ABSTRACT 
Social insurance systems are known to reproduce gender inequalities in the la-
bour market because they are usually based on “standard employment contracts” 
(full-time, permanent, dependent) and often take into account the household con-
stellation through means-testing. Gender inequalities in the labour market consist 
of higher part-time employment rates, more frequent movements between em-
ployment and inactivity and on average lower wages among women. These ine-
qualities are mainly due to the unequal distribution of household and family tasks 
between men and women. 
This paper will use the data of the European Household Panel to compare ac-
cess to and level of unemployment benefits between men and women. Differ-
ences in access to benefits are usually brought about by the following design 
features of unemployment benefits: hours and earnings thresholds, minimum 
contribution requirements, and means-testing, whereas the benefit levels in many 
systems are calculated as a share of former earnings, and among long-term un-
employed are also affected by means-testing.  
Since unemployment benefit systems of different countries strongly vary in their 
aims and design features, four countries are compared: Denmark, Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. It is expected that gender differences in unem-
ployment insurance outcomes will be smaller in countries that have more indi-
vidualised unemployment systems (Denmark) than in countries that make early 
use of strict means-testing (United Kingdom) or that strongly rely on equivalence 
between contribution time, former earnings and benefit receipt (Germany, Spain). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Da soziale Sicherungssysteme auf sogenannte Normalarbeitsverhältnisse (Voll-
zeit, unbefristet, abhängig) ausgerichtet sind und häufig von Bedarfsprüfungen 
Gebrauch machen, reproduzieren sie Geschlechterungleichheiten im Arbeits-
markt, die auf Grund der ungleichen Verteilung von Haushalts- und Familienauf-
gaben zwischen Frauen und Männern zustande kommen. So sind Frauen 
beispielsweise weit häufiger in Teilzeit beschäftigt, sie wechseln häufiger zwi-
schen Beschäftigung und Inaktivität und verdienen weiterhin durchschnittlich ge-
ringere Löhne als Männer. 
Das Papier vergleicht auf Basis der Daten des Europäischen Haushaltspanels 
den Deckungsgrad und die Höhe von Arbeitslosenversicherungsleistungen zwi-
schen Frauen und Männern. Unterschiede im Zugang zu Arbeitslosenversiche-
rungsleistungen werden unter anderem durch die folgenden Charakteristika von 
Arbeitslosenversicherungssystemen bestimmt: Einkommens- oder Stunden-
schwellenwerte, Mindestbeitragszeiten und Bedarfsprüfungen. Die Höhe der 
Leistungen hängt in vielen Systemen von der Höhe der vormaligen Arbeitsein-
kommen ab, wird aber bei Langzeitarbeitslosen häufig auch durch Bedarfsprü-
fungen bestimmt. 
Da die Arbeitslosenversicherungssysteme unterschiedlicher Länder in ihren Ziel-
setzungen und in ihrer Ausgestaltung variieren, werden hier vier verschiedene 
Systeme verglichen: das dänische, das deutsche, das spanische und das briti-
sche Arbeitslosenversicherungssystem. Es wird erwartet, dass die Unterschiede 
zwischen Frauen und Männern im Zugang zu Arbeitslosenversicherungsleistun-
gen in Ländern mit einem stark individualisierten Versicherungssystem (Däne-
mark) kleiner sind als in Ländern, die frühzeitigen und strikten Gebrauch von 
Bedarfsprüfungen (Vereinigtes Königreich) machen oder die auf starker Äquiva-
lenz zwischen Beitragszeiten und vormaligem Einkommen und Leistungs-
empfang (Deutschland, Spanien) beruhen.  
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1 Introduction  
Social insurance systems tend to favour workers with “standard employment con-
tracts” (full-time, permanent, dependent) and often take into account the house-
hold situation through means-testing. Insofar as these systems are thus likely to 
reproduce the gender inequalities displayed by labour market participation, wo-
men, due to their specific household and labour market position, may be ex-
pected to be disadvantaged when it comes to entitlement to and level of unem-
ployment benefits. 
The following features built into the design of unemployment systems can con-
tribute to inequalities between men and women concerning access to and level of 
unemployment benefits:  
- hours- or earnings thresholds  
- minimum contribution periods 
- means-testing 
- proportionality between earnings and benefits. 
The first two features can restrict access to benefits. Means-testing can have an 
influence on both access to and level of benefits. Proportionality between earn-
ings and benefits influences benefit levels.  
Firstly, hours- or earnings thresholds below which employers and employees do 
not pay contributions and employees do not receive benefits are detrimental to 
women’s entitlement to benefits because the share of women in (marginal) part-
time employment is much larger than the share of men. Secondly, in some bene-
fit systems part-time workers need more time to gain access to benefits than full-
time workers. What is more, women tend to change more often between em-
ployment and other activities such as household/carer activities and might there-
fore find it more difficult to fulfil the minimum contribution requirement within the 
specific reference period. Thirdly, via the household income the income of a part-
ner can lead to the abolition or downsizing of unemployment assistance benefits. 
And fourthly, in many benefit systems benefit levels are calculated as a propor-
tion of past earnings – part-time earnings but also the gender pay gap are there-
fore likely to be reproduced in the unemployment benefit system. 
The unemployment benefit systems of different countries display strong variation 
in their aims and design features, so that coverage and benefit levels may be ex-
pected to be more equal in some countries than in others. In order to test this, the 
paper looks at four countries exhibiting significant differences in their insurance 
principles, aims and design. Denmark has a highly individualised voluntary un-
employment insurance system with uniformly long-running insurance benefits and 
no unemployment assistance. Net replacement rates are higher for people with 
lower earnings. Germany, on the other hand, operates with high ceilings on earn-
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ings and benefits. This leads to a strong proportionality between former earnings 
and benefit levels. The duration of insurance benefits depends on the length of 
the contribution period and is usually not longer than a year. The basic benefit 
that replaced unemployment assistance is open to all employable people and is 
paid indefinitely on a means-tested basis, i.e. depending on household income 
and assets. The Spanish unemployment benefit system is similar to the German 
one in terms of design, but it is less generous and unemployment assistance, in 
contrast to the German and the British means-tested basic benefit, is payable for 
a short period only. In the United Kingdom, non-means-tested benefits are paid to 
eligible recipients only for a comparatively short period of six months. The basic 
benefit is open to all but means-testing is very strict. Both the insurance and the 
basic benefit are paid on a uniform flat-rate basis.  
This paper will compare these four countries by focusing on the above features of 
benefit systems that potentially lead to unequal outcomes between men and wo-
men in unemployment benefit coverage. A large part of gender differences in un-
employment benefit coverage is expected to be due to part-time employment, a 
form of work exercised, in the majority of cases, by women. It is expected that 
benefit systems that are more individualised (Denmark) will generate more equal 
outcomes than systems that make early use of means-testing (UK) or that are 
strongly reliant on equivalence between contribution time, former earnings and 
benefit receipt (Germany, Spain).  
A discussion on the male-breadwinner model will form the theoretical basis of the 
paper. The second section, on the basis of the European labour force survey da-
ta (LFS) and the European Community Household Panel data (ECHP), will exam-
ine differences between men and women as regards the extent of part-time em-
ployment, mobility patterns and wages, all of these being factors that potentially 
limit women’s entitlement to benefits. In a third step the unemployment insurance 
systems of the four countries are scrutinised in order to see which design fea-
tures potentially generate gender differences in benefit coverage and levels. The 
empirical section is based on the ECHP data. Benefit coverage and benefit levels 
of men and women are compared between the four countries. In a further step, 
indicators are constructed from the ECHP data which capture the design of the 
country’s benefit systems (hours and earnings thresholds, minimum contribution 
time and means-testing). They are introduced as independent variables into a 
random effect logistic regression model in order to exemplify in which ways the 
different countries’ benefit systems restrict entitlement to benefits.  
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2 Male breadwinner and standard employment 
Most of the information in this section is drawn from German studies – Germany 
being one of the prototypes of the male-breadwinner model. On the basis of the 
concepts forged using the German example, the other three countries will then be 
positioned.1   
Labour market institutions and social policies are devised in specific national set-
tings. A country’s self-representation rests upon a more or less explicit social 
contract that is influenced by the traditions and values of a specific society and is 
therefore path-dependent. Inherent in the social contract is usually both a gender 
contract and an employment contract. In Germany, for example, the gender con-
tract has traditionally been characterised by the male-breadwinner model (male 
provider and housewife), and the employment contract by ‘standard employment’ 
(Normalarbeitsverhältnis) which is dependent permanent full-time employment 
with high continuity and stability (for a comprehensive definition refer to Hinrichs, 
1996: 103). In this constellation standard employment applies mainly to men but 
it is evident that this social contract no longer adequately reflects reality since 
women’s labour market participation has increased considerably. Depending on 
the country, today, it is more appropriate to use the labels ‘male breadwinner and 
secondary earner’ (or male breadwinner plus) (West Germany), ‘double 
earner/double carer’ (Netherlands) or ‘double bread-winner with public service 
support’ (Scandinavia) (Holst and Maier, 1998: 515).  
Many labour market and social institutions in Germany are still based on the tra-
ditional division between male employment outside the home and female work 
within it and are therefore centred on standard employment contracts. German 
social insurance is usually beneficial for people in stable full-time employment; it 
often takes into account the household composition and there is frequent provi-
sion for derived rights for married partners (mostly women).2 Similarly, speaking 
of the British context, Sainsbury (1996: 55ff) states that the male-breadwinner 
model left its imprint on post-war reforms and recalls the existence of the adult 
dependent allowance and the possibility for married women to not pay national 
insurance contributions but to rely instead on their husband’s entitlements.3 Both 
                                            
1  There is also a considerable amount of Anglo-American literature that criticises the 
gender bias of the welfare state (compare for example Sainsbury 1996, Rubery et al. 
1998, Jepsen et al. 2002).  
2  In Germany health insurance for non-working partners of employees is free of char-
ge, widow’s pensions exist, and tax splitting financially privileges households with on-
ly one worker. Additionally, replacement rates in unemployment insurance are higher 
for recipients with children.  
3 By not paying contributions married women forfeited claims in their own right which 
resulted in a loss of pensions, sickness allowance, unemployment benefits, and the 
like. In the early 1970s about three quarters of married women made use of this pos-
sibility.  
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arrangements have now been abolished.4 Social benefits that are based on stan-
dard employment and the concept of a dependent partner not only manifest wo-
men’s dependence and discriminate against lifestyles that deviate from this norm 
but also set disincentives to labour market participation and – most important in 
the context of this paper – can lead to unequal outcomes in social insurance cov-
erage (compare for example Holst and Maier, 1998: 507ff; Bennett, 2005: 29ff).  
Geissler (1998) carries this discussion somewhat further by terming the strong re-
lationship between  standard employment and statutory social insurance a par-
ticular German employment model of the industrial society. This employment 
model is socially constructed and encompasses three pillars: living standard se-
curity via equivalence between earnings and benefits; security of employment 
continuity via benefit receipt in times of transition; and, derived from the promise 
of continuity, family and job planning security. Increasing numbers of people no 
longer fall under this employment model which leads to a shift from employment-
related security to a second-class security displaying a welfare character, visible 
through the growing numbers of those in receipt of social assistance. The prob-
lem is thus merely transferred to the welfare system which is less centred on em-
ployment. As such, the weaker position of women is not compensated, while 
segmentation in the labour market is reinforced. On the other hand, this division 
strengthens social insurance systems because it relieves them from ‘bad risks’ 
with discontinuous, low, and short contributions coupled with potentially long 
benefit receipt.  
As can be seen, solutions that grant more encompassing and equal security to all 
employed people are complex; not only has the design of benefits to be modified, 
but financing principles and mechanisms have also to be challenged.   
What are possible options that make social insurance systems more open? With 
reference to the German system the equivalence principle and therewith status 
maintenance are frequently called into question (Petersen, 1989: 95-99; Rolf et 
al., 1988: 527-531). Hinrichs (1996: 106f), for example, raises the question of 
whether more inclusive social insurance would not have to entail a lowering of 
ceilings in order to achieve financial sustainability. This would call for conces-
sions on the part of standard (male) workers so as to allow a broader group of 
employees to receive social insurance benefits.5  
A further possibility is basic or minimum insurance open to all people. But mini-
mum insurance is problematic insofar as it is usually means-tested. More women 
than men cannot establish entitlement to means-tested benefits because their 
                                            
4  The adult dependant allowance was phased out by April 1997; the possibility to opt 
out of national insurance was abolished in 1977. 
5  A possible downside often mentioned in this context could be lower legitimacy for so-
cial insurance and less willingness to pay contributions (Eisen 1988; Hinrichs 1996). 
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partners’ earnings surpass the threshold (Luckhaus, 2000: 162). Not only does 
this strengthen dependence but means-testing, by creating unemployment or in-
activity traps, can turn out to be more costly than universal benefits (Clasen and 
van Oorschot, 2002). Individualised benefits based on universal principles that 
encourage labour mobility and participation might thus be more suitable.  
Individualisation of entitlements could be achieved by abolishing derived rights. 
Benefits granted without regard to family circumstances do not only free financial 
resources for more encompassing social insurance but can also, by countering 
possible disincentives to work, generate additional financial means. Gradual indi-
vidualisation of social insurance entitlements is also called for in order to bring 
about a modern and egalitarian gender contract that would allow the establish-
ment of a new standard employment situation within reach of men and women 
(Klammer, 2001: 152f). This new standard employment situation could entail mo-
re flexible elements as long as sufficiently high wages and social insurance bene-
fits – and therewith financial independence for women – were to be granted.6  
Luckhaus (2000) argues that women are the main problem group in relation to in-
come security and social protection. Due to unpaid care activities large numbers 
of them are excluded from paid employment in the first place, so that social pro-
tection in such cases is possible only via a breadwinner (derived rights). Sains-
bury (1996: 72) identifies this dependence on the husband as the major short-
coming of the breadwinner model. Another group of women who lack income se-
curity are those who alternate between periods out of and periods in employment 
– often in part-time or low-paid work. In this case social insurance entitlements 
may be restricted due to earnings or hours thresholds. Furthermore, if benefits 
are closely linked to former earnings, social insurance payments will be low. In 
this way, social protection systems tend to reproduce the disadvantages suffered 
by women in the labour market – often as a result of their care obligations – 
rather than remove them.   
Luckhaus (2000: 174ff) looks at women’s social protection from two different an-
gles. The first takes up the social protection disadvantages suffered by women as 
a result of their engagement in unpaid work, while the second focuses on finan-
cial independence from a partner. Luckhaus is critical of the fact that, in theoreti-
cal debates, these issues tend to be treated separately and even pitted against 
each other. Concerning unpaid care work she argues against dependency-
related provisions in social insurance and instead calls for caring credits, caring 
                                            
6  Especially in the German context the focus should turn away from supporting non-
employment through social policy and tax arrangements. This would set free money 
for better securing those who are willing or forced to take up non-standard employ-
ment in order to participate in the labour market. A new standard employment relati-
onship would call for concessions by men who would have to trait some of their 
employment stability and employment extent against stronger participation in house-
hold and care activities. 
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allowances, or improved child-care services that may be combined with individu-
alisation of entitlement. Although this would generate a better and more stable 
position for women in general, this combination would not provide a solution to 
the specific forms of income insecurity suffered by part-time and low-paid workers 
which are not linked to unpaid work activities.  
How can the four countries be characterised from a theoretical viewpoint if some 
of the above concepts are used?  
Germany, as the prototype of continental European countries, seems to be espe-
cially ill-suited to cope with greater labour market flexibility (part-time work) and 
women’s economic independence (compare for example Esping-Andersen, 1995: 
68). This is mainly due to the prevalence of the equivalence principle, derived 
rights, and benefits based on household composition. Relatively generous bene-
fits are thus paid to labour market insiders while outsiders have to rely on minimal 
state support as a last resort (Kvist, 1998: 34). The situation is similar in Spain 
where the male-breadwinner model coupled with inadequate child-care and low 
female labour market participation is still very strong and, according to Fassler-
Ristic (1999), social insurance is heavily targeted on standard employment. In 
Denmark, on the other hand, equal rights of women to participate in standard 
employment have for a long time been supported through encompassing child-
care and individualised entitlement (compare for example Holst and Maier, 1998: 
507; Esping-Andersen, 1999). The United Kingdom’s social insurance system in-
corporates some elements of minimum insurance, for example, flat-rate unem-
ployment benefits. Private insurance, with its discriminating effects on low-income 
workers, therefore plays a greater role here than in other countries (Fink, 1999b). 
Derived rights in social insurance were common in the past but have seen a 
gradual reduction since the mid-1990s (Jepsen and Meulders, 2002: 112ff). 
Means-testing is comparatively strict and sets in at an early stage. 
3 Women, employment and the household context  
3.1 Part-time employment and employment rates 
Part-time employment is probably the single factor that most strongly influences 
unequal access to unemployment benefits between men and women. It can also 
negatively affect benefit levels if they are strictly calculated as a proportion of 
former earnings. In 2006, overall part-time employment rates were 12.1% in 
Spain, 22.9% in Denmark, 24.5% in the United Kingdom and 25.3% in Germany 
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(Eurostat 2006).7 But in all four countries part-time employment shares among 
women workers are considerably higher. About 45(42)% of German (British) wo-
men work part-time. In Denmark and Spain the shares are about 36% and 23%. 
Among men, part-time employment as a share of total employment is marginal, 
exceeding 10% in Denmark only. The fact that the level of education is inversely 
related to the part-time employment rate of women makes the situation even  
more worrisome. In Denmark and the United Kingdom the part-time employment 
rate of low qualified women is slightly above 50%, in Germany it is close to 50%, 
and in Spain 30% (Eurostat 2006).8 The concentration of workers with low educa-
tional attainment in part-time employment is especially problematic because the 
coupling of low hours and low hourly wages leaves them with marginal earnings 
which may be carried through into the benefit systems. 
In 2006, average weekly hours of female part-time workers lay between 18 in 
Germany and 20.7 in Denmark. In all four countries women’s average part-time 
hours are somewhat higher than men’s but only in Denmark is this difference 
considerable with average weekly part-time hours of men at only 14.1 hours. 
An important question is whether part-time employment is exercised voluntarily or 
not. Figure 1 shows that only in Denmark a considerable share of female part-
time workers did not want a full-time job in the first place (about 40%) while in the 
other three countries this is true of only between 10% and 15% of part-time work-
ers. In the United Kingdom and especially Germany the majority of respondents 
work part-time because of family responsibilities – in the prime-age group of 
women the shares are about 70% in both countries. In Denmark, and to a lesser 
degree Spain, family responsibilities are not an important reason for working part-
time. In Denmark this is attributable to high child-care facility coverage especially 
for very young children, an aspect that will be examined in the following section 
(Eichhorst et al., 2001: 414). In Spain, on the other hand, permanent withdrawal 
from the labour market after marriage or child birth is still common (OECD, 2002: 
70-73). The fact that, in contrast to Denmark and Spain, in both the United King-
dom and Germany part-time workers are more likely to be married than the over-
all population further supports the existence of an extended male bread-winner 
model in the latter two countries.  
                                            
7  The following statistics are based on the European Labour Force Survey data. They 
refer to the 2nd quarter of 2006. The distinction between full-time and part-time 
employment in the Labour Force Survey data is based on self-assessment of the in-
terviewed persons and thus depends on whether a person perceives his employment 
contract as part-time or full-time.  
8  In Denmark this result is driven by the fact that part-time employment is often used 
by students who have not yet reached their highest education level. 
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Figure 1:  Reasons for women (15-64) to work part-time, 2006 
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Source: Eurostat LFS data. 
Looking at the influence of the presence of children on women’s employment ra-
tes, the general patterns are seen to be similar in Germany, Spain, and the Uni-
ted Kingdom: employment rates are highest for women without children and de-
crease with the number of children. The differences between women without and 
women with two or more children are highest in Germany, followed closely by the 
United Kingdom. The distribution in Spain is closer but employment rates among 
women are generally very low. In Denmark, high women’s employment rates are 
even higher for women with one child than for women without children – the pre-
sence of two or more children does not have a negative influence on women’s la-
bour market participation (OECD, 2002).9  
Figure 2 shows what share of working mothers combine work and family via part-
time employment. The part-time employment profile of mothers is very similar in 
the United Kingdom and Germany: children significantly increase part-time em-
ployment among women but further reduce already low part-time employment 
rates among men. Part-time employment among women with at least two chil-
dren exceeds 60 percent, whereas the part-time rates of women without children 
are around 20 percent. The results for Spain confirm that part-time employment 
fulfils a different function – part-time employment rates do not vary strongly be-
tween women without and women with children. The results for Denmark are in 
line with the non-importance of family or personal responsibilities as a reason for 
working part-time. The number of children does not increase the part-time rate of 
                                            
9  In Europe there is today a positive correlation between fertility and women’s paid 
employment – the higher the rate of female employment, the greater the level of fer-
tility. For more information refer to Esping-Andersen 1999. 
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women – on the contrary – women with one child not only have higher employ-
ment rates than women without children but they also less frequently work part-
time.  
Figure 2:  Part-time work among prime-age women by presence of children  
in 2000 
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Source: data from OECD (2002: 78). Children under 15. 
Why are Danish mothers able to work full-time? OECD (2001) demonstrates that 
there is a positive relationship across countries between policies designed to im-
prove the reconciliation of work and family (formal childcare coverage and paid 
maternity leave policies) and women’s employment rates. Similarly, Lind et al. 
(1999: 223-226) argue that declining part-time rates in Denmark are due to the 
strong expansion of public childcare facilities that allow women to deliberately 
choose in favour of full-time employment. For the United Kingdom, on the other 
hand, they argue that many women work part-time in order to care for their chil-
dren in the absence of sufficient state-provided childcare. Indeed, coverage of 
formal childcare facilities, especially for very young children, is much higher in 
Denmark (64% in 1998) than in the other three countries (OECD, 2001).10  
                                            
10  In 2000, formal coverage rates for children younger than three are 34% in the UK 
and 10(5)% in Germany and Spain. For children from 3 to mandatory school age 
formal coverage rates become closer between countries but remain highest in Den-
mark. 
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3.2 Mobility patterns among women and men  
Figure 3 illustrates that, except for Germany, women are considerably more likely 
than men to exit employment.11 Figure 3 does not distinguish between different 
types of exit (unemployment, inactivity, housework, education or other activities). 
In Denmark and the United Kingdom, for example, after 15 month of employment 
about 28(21)% of women left employment at least for a short period, while this is 
true of only about 20(15)% of men. Exit probabilities are considerably higher in 
Spain among both men and women – after 15 months of employment about half 
of all women have left the labour market at least for a short period. 
In all countries part-time workers are more likely to exit employment but countries 
vary markedly in the extent of the differences.12 Failure rates of full-time and part-
time workers are closest in Germany, followed by the United Kingdom, whereas 
part-time workers show much higher exit rates than full-time workers in Denmark 
and especially in Spain (compare Figure 4). The hazard of exit is very high during 
the first 24 months of recorded employment, which might be especially problem-
atic because people might not have spent enough time in employment to be enti-
tled to unemployment benefits. After two years about 35% of Danish part-time 
workers and about 60% of Spanish part-time workers have left employment at le-
ast for a short period. The higher incidence of exits from employment to non-
employment among part-time workers in Denmark and in Spain as compared to 
Germany and the United Kingdom might be due, at least in part, to the fact that 
part-time contracts in Denmark and especially in Spain are more often of a tem-
porary nature. 
If we compare year-to-year transitions of prime-age full-time and part-time work-
ers between men and women we see that female full-time employment is less 
stable than male full-time employment in all countries, whereas female part-time 
employment is much more stable than male part-time employment (compare Ta-
bles 1 and 2). The transition matrices actually reveal that part-time employment 
exercises a very different function for men and for women: not only are men more 
likely than women to change from part-time employment to education from one 
year to the next but, with shares of between 36% in Germany and 53% in Spain, 
they are also considerably more likely to make upward transitions to full-time em-
ployment; the corresponding shares for women lie between 15% in Germany and 
the United Kingdom and 24% in Spain. In contrast, except for Denmark, women  
 
                                            
11  Figures 3 and 4 are based on ‘life tables’ which are commonly used to present re-
sults from event history analysis in a descriptive way. See annex 2 for more informa-
tion on the method.  
12  The differences between countries are supported by the log-rank test for equality of 
survivor function. In all cases, the probability that subgroup differences occur by 
chance is less than 0.000. The null hypothesis of no subgroup differences in survivor 
functions can thus be rejected (StataCorp, 2005).  
 Figure 3:  Exits from employment for prime age (25-55) male and female workers (cumulated failure rates) 
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Source: Own calculation based on ECHP data (1994-2001), multiple spells per individual are possible.
 Figure 4: Exits from employment for prime age (25-55) full-time and part-time workers (cumulated failure rates) 
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Source: Own calculation based on ECHP data (1994-2001), multiple spells per individual are possible. 
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are slightly more likely in Germany and considerably more likely in Spain and the 
United Kingdom to change from part-time employment to inactivity from one year 
to the next. Furthermore, part-time employment among women is rather persis-
tent; in Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom around 50% and in Spain 
around 40% of prime-age female part-time workers in a given year are still part-
time employed four years later (see Annex 1, Table 9). For men these shares are 
around 20% in Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom, and close to 30% in 
Germany.13  
Table 1:  Transitions from full-time and part-time employment  
for prime-age (25-55) women  
  t+1 
t  full-time part-time education unempl. inactive 
DK 91.13 3.46 0.87 3.13 1.41 
DE 89.21 4.05 0.79 4.14 1.81 
SP 85.42 4.02 0.29 5.00 5.27 
full-time 
UK 87.58 6.55 0.26 1.52 4.09 
 
DK 17.42 72.16 2.61 5.32 2.48   
DE 15.89 70.91 0.72 2.51   9.97 
SP 24.12 51.96 0.79 8.52 14.62 
part-time 
UK 15.30 69.94 0.28 2.00   12.48 
Source: Own calculation; pooled and weighted ECHP data 1994-2001, employment refers to em-
ployment of more than 1 hour. 
Table 2:  Transitions from full-time and part-time employment  
for prime age (25-55) men  
  t+1 
t  full-time part-time education unempl. inactive 
DK 96.20 0.77 0.51 2.08 0.44 
DE 94.28 0.70 0.52 3.16 1.34 
SP 92.79 1.33 0.09 4.99 0.80 
full-time 
UK 94.88 1.00 0.17 1.67 2.29 
 
DK 46.01 40.42 5.21 6.09 2.28   
DE 36.50 42.44 10.75 1.41   8.90 
SP 53.34 28.48 2.19 12.96 3.03 
part-time 
UK 43.86 40.33 1.51 5.82  8.47 
Source: Own calculation; pooled and weighted ECHP data 1994-2001, employment refers to em-
ployment of more than 1 hour. 
                                            
13  The results for men should be treated with caution because case numbers are very 
small (between 14 and 40). This is also the reason why no table for men is displayed 
in the annex.  
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In all four countries part-time workers (men and women) are more likely than full-
time workers to leave employment. Especially exits to inactivity – which include 
household activities – are much more important among part-time workers than 
among full-time workers.  
To sum up, continuous employment periods are less likely among part-time than 
among full-time workers and are, on average, shorter among women (except for 
Germany) than among men. What is more, men – who represent a much lower 
share of part-time workers – are more likely to exploit the stepping-stone function 
of part-time employment, while women tend to remain in part-time employment 
over longer periods.  
3.3 The gender pay gap 
If the differences between the relative pay of men and women are considered 
without controlling for full-time and part-time employment in the four country 
groups under consideration here (liberal, continental, social democratic, and Me-
diterranean), around half of all women – as against only about 20% of men – are 
positioned in the bottom third of the earnings groups (Eurofound, 2007).14 This is 
partly due to the fact that women are considerably more likely to work part-time. 
Within part-time work, the differences in wages of male and female workers are 
relatively small but in the case of full-time employment the wage gap between 
men and women is very large. In particular, women are underrepresented in the 
top third of the income scale (ibid). 
In 2004, differences between women’s and men’s average gross hourly earnings 
– thus not taking into account the much higher shares of part-time employment 
among women – amount to 15% in Spain, 17% in Denmark, 22% in the United 
Kingdom and 23% in Germany (calculated as percentage of men’s average gross 
hourly earnings). There are no clear trends towards a reduction of the gender pay 
gap. On the contrary, in Denmark and Germany the gender pay gap has actually 
increased over the last ten years. In 2001, in all countries, the gender pay gap 
was largest among the 55-64 age group but also present in the 16-24 age group. 
With regard to educational attainment there is no common trend: in Denmark the 
gender pay gap is greatest among those with high educational attainment, while 
in Germany and Spain it is greatest among those with a lower level of educational 
attainment (no data for the UK) (European Commission, 2006a).  
                                            
14  Eight country groups based on a modified Esping-Andersen typology are used in the 
report for presenting the results, among them a liberal group (UK, IE), a continental 
group (DE, BE, FR, LU, AT), a social democratic group (DK, NL, FI, SE), and a Medi-
terranean group (ES, EI, IT, CY, MT, PT). No single country results are presented. 
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4 Unemployment benefits  
There is no direct gender discrimination in benefit coverage. Instead gender dif-
ferences in benefit coverage are mediated by the fact that women are more likely 
than men to work few hours and to have short contribution records or low earn-
ings. Luckhaus (2000: 152) and Rubery et al. (1998: 156) recall different barriers 
that may restrict social insurance entitlements for women – especially if they are 
part-time workers: first, the requirement of having been in paid work for a certain 
number of hours or having earned a certain amount per week; second, eligibility 
conditions which require a continuous employment history; and third, a method of 
calculating benefit amounts that is geared closely to former earnings. These three 
features frequently built into the design of unemployment insurance systems will 
now be examined. Additionally, means-testing and specific legislation directly 
geared to part-time workers will be considered. A general problem in seeking to 
describe insurance systems is that they are constantly evolving. The following 
sections will focus on the present situation and will in some points recall devel-
opments over the 1990s. Table 3, at the end of this chapter, will give a synopsis 
of the unemployment insurance rules with a special focus on part-time workers.  
4.1 Main features of the unemployment insurance systems in the four 
countries 
Unemployment insurance in Denmark is voluntary, and about 80% of the labour 
force is insured against this risk. There is no unemployment assistance scheme, 
the municipalities being responsible for labour market integration and social secu-
rity of people who are not insured and people who do not qualify for insurance 
benefits. The Danish unemployment insurance system is administered by more 
than 30 independent unemployment insurance funds that cover different sectors 
and occupations and are closely associated with the trade unions but subject to 
directions from the Ministry of Employment. The unemployment insurance funds 
are open not only to employees but also to those undergoing apprenticeship or 
military service (both groups receive reduced benefits), as well as to civil servants 
and the self-employed. Admission to one of the funds may take place on a full-
time or a part-time basis; a minimum of one year’s membership is a precondition 
for access to unemployment benefits and the self-employed have to fulfil a wait-
ing period of four weeks before they can receive benefits (European Commission, 
2004: 276-301). Unemployment insurance is state-financed through the unem-
ployment benefit fund, the revenue of which derives from the following sources: 
income-related contributions paid together with income tax by employees and 
self-employed and, since 1997 also by employers, contributions to the unem-
ployment insurance funds plus an administration fee which are independent of 
earnings but dependent on status (full-time or part-time), contributions from em-
ployers in the form of a special 3% value-added tax, and transfers from the state. 
In 2000, total labour market contributions to the three labour market funds, one of 
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which is the unemployment benefit fund, amounted to 8% of earned income and 
profits from self-employment.15 Earnings-related contributions are also paid by 
non-insured persons (Danish Ministry of Labour, 2001). Although the benefit pe-
riod has been shortened to four years (one passive year and three active years), 
in international comparison it is still very long (Braun, 2001: 659ff; Lind, 1999: 
195ff).  
In Germany, unemployment insurance is obligatory for all employees (manual, 
white-collar workers and trainees) except marginal workers. Civil servants and 
most groups of self-employed are also excluded from unemployment insurance. 
The main responsibility for unemployment insurance and active labour market po-
licies lies with the Federal Labour Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). Regional 
labour directorates and local labour agencies are responsible for job placement 
and training. Unemployment benefits consist of unemployment insurance (Arbeit-
slosengeld I) and a minimum flat-rate benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II) for all unem-
ployed who are capable of work and who are not or no longer eligible for unem-
ployment insurance benefits. Unemployment insurance and a large proportion of 
active labour market policy measures are financed by employer and employee 
contributions which are presently fixed at 3.25% of the wage each. Additionally, 
there is deficit financing by the state. Unemployment assistance used to be fi-
nanced by the federal state; the new basic unemployment benefit is financed by 
both federal state and local authorities.  
The modern Spanish unemployment insurance was established in 1980 by the 
Ley Básica de Empleo. The State Public Employment Service (Servicio Público 
de Empleo Estatal, SEPEE) manages the unemployment benefits. Social insur-
ance is compulsory for employees and assimilated groups. Unemployment bene-
fits consist of unemployment insurance (prestación contributiva por desempleo) 
and unemployment assistance (subsidio por desempleo). People not qualifying 
for unemployment benefits can gain access to social assistance which is adminis-
tered by the autonomous communities and not uniform over the whole country. 
Unemployment benefits are financed by employer and employee contributions, 
contributions being usually 7.55% of which 1.55% is paid by the employee and 
6% by the employer. The state covers some of the cost of unemployment bene-
fits (European Commission, 2004: 89). Expenditure on passive and active labour 
market policies measured as a share of GDP is considerably lower than in Den-
mark and Germany – especially if the unemployment rate is taken into account – 
but higher than in the United Kingdom (OECD, 2003). Since 1997 employers en-
joy reduced social insurance contributions if they hire people with specific charac-
teristics on the basis of a permanent contract (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2001: 
                                            
15  The rate of contribution payments as a proportion of earnings was very low before 
1994 (about 2% of average earnings) and there was almost complete reliance on 
general taxation as a means of financing social security expenditure (Rubery et al. 
1998).  
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40ff). The Spanish unemployment insurance was thoroughly revised in 1992, 
mainly because of the financial strains suffered by the system (Toharia and Malo, 
2000: 320ff).  
The present British insurance system is based on the Jobseeker’s Act of 1995 
which replaced unemployment insurance and social assistance with the so-called 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) which is granted to all people who are capable of 
work. Jobseeker’s Allowance consists of two different benefits: contribution-
based Jobseeker’s Allowance and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance. In the 
United Kingdom all employees are compulsorily insured. Self-employed workers 
who become unemployed can claim means-tested income-based Jobseeker’s Al-
lowance. Means-tested benefits predominate because contribution-based bene-
fits are paid only for a period of six months. The financing of unemployment in-
surance takes place via employers’ and employees’ income-related contributions 
to National Insurance and subsidies by the state. Due to the fact that social in-
surance contributions are not directly attributable to a certain benefit and that 
benefits are paid out on a flat-rate basis, the insurance principle is very weak in 
the UK (Schmid and Reissert, 1996: 243).  
Hours and earnings thresholds  
In many countries hours and/or earnings thresholds are specified in a manner 
that excludes people who work low hours or earn wages below the threshold from 
contributions to social insurance and accordingly also from access to benefits. 
Employment of this kind is usually referred to as marginal employment. For pur-
poses of international comparison a 15-hours threshold is often posited, although 
there are variations between countries and also within countries over time. Mar-
ginal employment is for the most part taken up by women. At present, earnings-
related rules for marginal employment exist in the United Kingdom and Germany, 
while working-time-related rules used to exist in all four countries but have been 
abolished (see synopsis, Table 3).  
In Denmark, until January 1994, workers needed at least 15 hours of weekly 
employment during the past ten weeks before being accepted as part-time mem-
ber of an unemployment insurance fund (Fink, 1999a: 101; Delsen, 1995: 118). 
Now, basically, access to unemployment insurance funds is possible from the 
first hour of work on, although, in reality, entitlement is limited by minimum quali-
fying requirements as will be seen subsequently (Braun, 2001: 651f). In Ger-
many, with the recent Hartz reforms, the 15-hour limit for unemployment insur-
ance liability has been abolished but the maximum earnings for marginal part-
time workers that are not liable to social insurance contributions have been raised 
to €400 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 30. Dezember 2002). The hours threshold of 12 
hours a week introduced in Spain in 1993 was abolished again in 1998. If they 
fulfil the other access requirements, part-time workers are entitled to unemploy-
ment insurance benefits in proportion to their working hours irrespective of how 
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little time they worked (Royal Decree No. 15/1998). In the United Kingdom earn-
ings thresholds apply to social insurance contributions and receipts. In 2006/2007 
the lower earnings limit is £84 (€124) a week; the primary earnings threshold is 
£97 (€143) a week (Law Centre, 2006). Earnings below the lower earnings limit 
are not liable to National Insurance contributions and do not give access to un-
employment insurance benefits (contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance). For 
wages between the lower earnings limit and the earnings threshold no contribu-
tions are paid but employees gain entitlement to contribution-based unemploy-
ment insurance benefits.  
Minimum contribution period  
The European Foundation (2003: 69) argues, on the basis of comprehensive 
country studies, that the contribution period needed for entitlement or re-
entitlement to benefits plays an important part in access to unemployment insur-
ance for workers on flexible contracts. In particular, calculation methods based on 
full days of work risk putting part-time workers at a severe disadvantage.  
In Denmark, since 1997 the contribution period has been 52 weeks of employ-
ment (usually full-time hours within the industry) within a reference period of three 
years. Additionally, a one-year membership of an unemployment insurance fund 
is required. For part-time employees (part-time insured) the employment re-
quirement is 34 weeks of full-time equivalent16 employment (Rubery et al., 1998: 
158; Fink, 1999a: 100). This requires continuous employment of eight hours a 
week during the three preceding years or shorter work periods at higher hours. 
Renewal of rights to unemployment insurance benefits is possible after 26 (17) 
weeks of work within the last three years (Hansen, 2002: 28ff). In Germany, sin-
ce January 2006, the minimum eligibility requirement for unemployment insur-
ance benefit receipt has been twelve months of contributory employment within 
two years preceding the onset of unemployment (SGB III, § 123, 124). Due to the 
fact that months and not days or hours of employment are the basis of the eligibil-
ity requirement in Germany, part-time workers who exceed the earnings thresh-
old and thus pay social security contributions have the same chance as full-time 
employees of qualifying for benefits. In Spain a minimum of 360 days of work are 
required during the six years immediately preceding unemployment. From 1994 
on qualifying for unemployment insurance benefits was more difficult for part-time 
workers and especially for those with low hours because real working time, in-
stead of working days, was counted as contribution period. Since 1999 unem-
ployment insurance entitlement has once again been based on days worked 
(Fassler-Ristic, 1999: 374-379). Entitlement rules which are based on working 
days instead of weeks or months render access to benefits more difficult for part-
                                            
16  Full-time equivalent is defined as full normal working hours within the trade or occu-
pational field. In most cases these are 37 hours. 
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time workers who work less than five days a week. Due to the application of the 
proportionality rule (contribution time to benefit time) this also affects the duration 
of benefit receipt in Spain (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 2006a).17 In 
the United Kingdom, the qualifying criteria for contribution-based Jobseeker’s 
Allowance stipulate that in one of the two tax years prior to the calendar year in 
which the claim is made contributions must have been paid that amount to at le-
ast 25 times the minimum contribution (lower earnings limit) for that year. As a 
further requirement, contributions paid or credited18 in each of the two tax years 
have to amount to at least 50 times the minimum contribution (European Com-
mission, 2004: 845; Hansen, 2002: 27, 28). Contribution requirements are thus 
more difficult to fulfil for persons with low earnings. Especially problematic is a 
combination of low earnings and discontinuous employment.  
Net replacement rates  
There is a range of possibilities for calculating replacement rates and adapting 
them for part-time workers. Unemployment benefits are often determined as a 
percentage of the former wage (Germany, Spain), another possibility being ma-
ximum unemployment benefits that vary between former full-time and part-time 
workers (Denmark). Uniform unemployment insurance benefits of a flat-rate na-
ture (United Kingdom) are rare. Groups with low average earnings – such as 
part-time workers, the low qualified, and on average also women – receive lower 
benefits than high-wage groups in countries where benefits are calculated as a 
direct proportion of previous earnings. Upper thresholds that cap the benefit level 
at a specific point can modify this effect and redistribute benefits towards lower 
income groups (Denmark). More equitable treatment of lower income groups ta-
kes place in systems where benefits are paid as a fixed amount or where a mini-
mum or maximum replacement income is granted. Equitable compensation as 
such is not necessarily an appropriate measure, however, because if it is very 
low – which is usually the case with flat-rate benefits – it is unfavourable to all 
groups (compare Rubery et al., 1998: 168ff). 
If benefit levels are strongly linked to past earnings, those whose earnings were 
low may find themselves with a replacement income that does not enable them to 
make ends meet. This problem can be attenuated through high replacement ra-
                                            
17  Recently, Spain’s Constitutional Court ruled that present regulations on contributions 
required for getting access to social security benefits discriminate against part-time 
workers and indirectly also against women. The court called for an annulment of the 
corresponding legislation (Albarracín 2005). 
18  Contribution credits are added to the contribution record when a person is unem-
ployed, not capable of work, on a carer allowance or on Statutory Maternity pay and 
the like. Contribution credits are often not granted automatically and furthermore do 
not in all cases count towards the contribution requirement for contribution-based 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (Social Security Regulations, No. 2367).  
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tes or by way of a guaranteed minimum benefit amount that can be granted either 
directly via the unemployment insurance system or indirectly by way of supple-
menting insurance benefits with social assistance. What are the specific rules go-
verning the calculation of net replacement rates in the countries under observa-
tion? Are they beneficial for workers with low earnings such as part-time workers 
or do they grant only low replacement income?  
In Denmark net replacement rates are high for former low-income workers, inso-
far as 90% of the reference earnings are granted. There are no ceilings for con-
tribution payments but the maximum benefit amount is currently DKK 3335 
(€447) per week which leads to net replacement rates that decrease with growing 
former earnings (European Commission, 2006b: 110). Part-time insured persons 
pay two-thirds of the contributions to the unemployment insurance fund and the 
ceiling for their benefits is two thirds of the maximum rate for a full-time insured 
person (Parsons et al., 2003: 16; Jensen, 1999: 2). At present the ceiling for part-
time insured is DKK 2225 (€298) per week (The National Directorate of Labour, 
2006). In Germany net replacement rates vary with the family circumstances. 
People without family obligations receive 60% of former net earnings and those 
with children receive 67%. Compared to Denmark earnings ceilings are very high 
at €5150 (€4350) per month in the old (new) Länder (European Commission, 
2004: 284). Whereas in Denmark net replacement rates visibly decrease with 
growing former earnings (low earnings are rewarded with higher net replacement 
rates), high ceilings in Germany lead to constant net replacement rates over a 
large income margin. With the 2005 reforms, unemployment assistance that used 
to be calculated on the former earnings has been replaced by a means-tested 
flat-rate allowance (Arbeitslosengeld II).19 In Spain the replacement ratio is 70% 
of former earnings during the first six months of unemployment and 60% thereaf-
ter (Bover et al., 2002: 258). There are minimum and maximum benefit levels that 
vary with family circumstances and that are reduced for part-time workers in pro-
portion to the hours that have been worked (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos So-
ciales, 2006a). The United Kingdom grants flat-rate unemployment benefits (u-
sually in combination with housing benefits) instead of a replacement income that 
is related to previous earnings. In the case of unemployment insurance (contribu-
tion-based Jobseeker’s Allowance), the amount of the flat-rate benefit depends 
exclusively on the age of the recipient, being lower for those younger than 25 
years. The general level of the flat-rate compensation does not vary between 
former full-time and part-time workers but is very low in international comparison 
(Mohr, 2004: 294-298).  
                                            
19  Until 1999 people who had been employed subject to social insurance contribution 
for at least 150 days within the reference period were entitled to income-related 
means-tested unemployment assistance. From 2000 until the end of 2004 unem-
ployment assistance was granted only to those who had exhausted their unemploy-
ment insurance entitlement. 
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Means-testing  
In contrast to unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and social as-
sistance benefits are usually means-tested and in most countries they do not 
grant access to the same range of active labour market policy measures as in-
surance benefits. Compared to other West European countries, Denmark is 
characterised by a very long duration of insurance benefit payments that are 
coupled with obligatory participation in active labour market policies. There is no 
unemployment assistance in Denmark but people who are not insured or who do 
not fulfil the eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance benefits can claim 
means-tested social assistance benefits which are administered by the munici-
palities. The level is higher for recipients with children. In Germany, since 2003, 
the minimum duration for unemployment insurance benefits has been six months, 
while the maximum duration is twelve months (18 months for people above 55 
years with long contribution records). The benefit period depends on the contribu-
tion record. Those who exhaust their insurance benefits or who are not eligible for 
insurance benefits receive a low flat-rate basic allowance (Arbeitslosengeld II) 
which is subject to means-testing. The level of the allowance depends on the fa-
mily situation. In Spain, insurance benefits are paid for between four months and 
two years depending on the contribution period. The minimum contribution period 
of twelve months gives rise to four months of benefit receipt. Means-tested un-
employment assistance is granted either as a follow-up benefit or where a person 
is not eligible for insurance benefits but has paid some contributions. The benefit 
period depends on the contribution record, the age, and the family situation of the 
beneficiary. The duration of unemployment assistance ranges from 3 to 30 
months (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 2006b). In the United King-
dom the uniform duration of unemployment insurance benefits (contribution-
based Jobseeker’s Allowance) was cut from twelve to six months in 1996. 
Means-tested income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance can be granted as a follow-
up or alternative benefit for an unlimited period. The level is generally the same 
as for unemployment insurance but the household situation is taken into account 
and means-testing applies. It is granted only if the partner of the recipient does 
not work more than 24 hours and savings do not exceed £8000 (Department for 
Work and Pensions 2006). In order to ensure consistent activation of all employ-
able groups, it is administered by the same authority as contribution-based Job-
seeker’s Allowance.20  
                                            
20  For information on the specific rules of means-testing that apply to the four countries 
refer to (European Commission, 2006b).  
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Specific legislation benefiting former part-time workers  
In some countries special rules which are beneficial to part-time workers are in 
place in relation to unemployment insurance benefit receipt. A prominent exam-
ple is the possibility to base unemployment benefits on former full-time employ-
ment earnings instead of the actual part-time earnings for a transitional period 
(Germany). This possibility has been introduced in some countries to encourage 
full-time employees to switch to part-time employment. Furthermore, often spe-
cific rules exist that allow the combination of unemployment benefit receipt and 
part-time employment. In Denmark, for example, a person who becomes partially 
unemployed or who starts a part-time job may receive complementary unem-
ployment benefits if s/he is available for full-time work (or for employment of 30 
hours if s/he is part-time insured) (The National Directorate of Labour, 2006: 11). 
In Germany, a person who exercises two jobs under compulsory insurance cov-
erage, loses one of them, and seeks a new additional part-time or full-time job 
has a right to six months of supplementary unemployment benefits. These rules 
are usually rather restrictive in order to prevent abuse or disincentives.  
Table 3 gives a synopsis of the unemployment insurance rules in the four coun-
tries that potentially generate gender differences in benefit coverage or levels. 
5 Empirical analysis 
Using the ECHP data, this section will first present some descriptive results on 
the entitlement of men and women to benefits and their average benefit levels. In 
a further step, an attempt is made to incorporate the above information on the 
benefit systems into the analysis by constructing, from the ECHP data, proxies 
for the institutional configurations of the four countries’ unemployment insurance 
systems. The data does not allow distinguishing between unemployment insur-
ance and unemployment assistance benefits. 
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
Figure 5 compares benefit coverage between registered men and women and all 
men and women seeking work (registered and not registered). The data refers to 
2000 and 2001.21 The strategy of looking at both registered unemployed and all 
unemployed jobseekers is, for example, suggested by Atkinson et al.  
 
                                            
21  Pooling of both years is necessary because case numbers for Denmark and the Uni-
ted Kingdom are very low. 
 Table 3:  Synopsis of unemployment insurance rules with a special focus on part-time workers 
 Denmark Germany Spain United Kingdom 
hours’ or wage 
level threshold  
 
? access 
? until 1994 membership in UI* fund 
was not possible for persons who 
were employed for less than 15 
hours a week 
? at present membership is possible 
from the first hour onwards 
? until 1997 hours threshold at 18 
hours (for UI and UA**) 
? since April 1997 threshold at 15 
hours and possibility to add up em-
ployment for access 
? since 1999 uniform earnings thresh-
old of €322 
? Hartz reform: hours threshold abol-
ished, earnings’ threshold of €400 
? before 1993 no hours threshold ap-
plied 
? between 1994 and 1998 part-time 
employment below 12 hours was ex-
cluded from unemployment insur-
ance benefit receipt 
? it was re-included in the end of 1998 
(pro rata temporis) 
? an earnings threshold applies (adap-
ted yearly)  
? since 2000 there is a small earnings 
bracket in which persons do not have 
to pay National Insurance Contribu-
tions but gain entitlement to benefits 
? in 2006/2007 the lower earnings limit 
is £84, the primary earnings thresh-
old is £97 
minimum  
contribution  
period 
 
? access 
general:  
? one year membership in UI fund 
? until 1996 26 weeks insured em-
ployment within preceding 3 years af-
ter joining fund 
? since 1997 52 weeks in last 3 years 
(full-time employment), renewal of 
rights after 26 weeks  
part-time insured: 
? before 1997 uniform 26 weeks 
? since 1997 34 weeks full-time 
equivalent instead of 52 weeks, re-
newal of rights after 17 weeks  
general:  
? UI: 12 months of insured employ-
ment during last 3 years, since 2006 
during last 2 years  
? UA until 1999: 150 calendar days of 
insured employment, until the end of 
2004 only as follow-up benefit  
? since 2005 low means-tested flat-
rate benefit (ALG II) for all employ-
able without contribution requirement 
part-time workers: 
? no disadvantages  
general:  
? UI: at least 360 days of insured em-
ployment in the 6 preceding years  
? UA: at least 90 days (means-tested) 
part-time workers:  
? from 1994 on contribution is based 
on time actually worked 
? since 1999 every working day counts 
towards contribution period inde-
pendent of hours worked (more diffi-
cult to enter for those who work less 
than 5 days per week) 
general:  
? UI: 25 times the minimum contribu-
tion in the preceding year, addition-
ally, in the two preceding years at 
least 50 times the minimum contribu-
tion  
? UA: no conditions but means-tested  
part-time workers:  
? No direct disadvantages but difficulty 
to gain entitlement to contribution-
based JSA*** for persons with low 
earnings (part-time) and/or discon-
tinuous employment 
dependence  
on former  
wage level 
 
? level 
? yes, replacement rate is 90% com-
bined with low ceilings 
part-time insured: 
? can at the highest receive 2/3rd of 
maximum benefit; the  minimum be-
nefit does not apply to former part-
time employed 
? low ceilings lead to redistribution 
from high to low earners 
? yes, UI: 67% (60% without children) 
combined with high ceilings 
? UA: formerly 57% (53%), now low 
flat-rate basic benefit 
part-time workers: 
? special rule for those that changed 
from full-time to part-time: for a cer-
tain period they can receive UI bene-
fits dependent on their former wage  
? yes, UI: 70%, after 6 months 60%,  
? no, UA: between 80% and 225% of 
IPREM+ depending on age, contribu-
tion time and children 
part-time workers: 
? upper benefit limit and minimum be-
nefit (UI and UA) are reduced for 
former part-time employed propor-
tional to their hours 
? no, UI and UA are low flat rate bene-
fits 
? In 2006 unemployed aged 25 or over 
receive £57.45 per week, unem-
ployed 18 to 24 receive £45.50 and 
unemployed aged 16 to 17 receive 
£34.60 per week 
Mean-testing 
 
? access,   level 
? UI is granted to all who are entitled 
for 4 years (1 year passive, 3 years 
active)  
? UA does not exist but means-tested 
social assistance is paid at a rela-
tively high level 
? UI: minimum 6 months, maximum 12 
months (dependent on contribution 
time: proportion 2 to 1), 18 months 
for elderly  
? UA (now basic benefit): indefinite but 
subject to means-testing 
? UI: minimum 4 months, maximum 24 
months (dependent on contribution 
time: proportion3 to 1) 
? UA: 3 to 30 months, normally 6 
months, subject to means-testing  
? UI: 6 months for all 
? UA: indefinite but subject to strict 
means- testing (UA is not granted to 
unemployed whose partner works 
more than 24 hours a week) 
* Unemployment insurance; ** Unemployment assistance; *** Jobseeker’s Allowance; + Public Indicator of Multiple Effects Income. Source: Own synopsis, from various sources. 
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(1991: 1683) because to look solely at the coverage rate of the registered unem-
ployed might give a false picture of true benefit coverage insofar as people who 
believe themselves to be ineligible for benefit may well not bother to register at 
the employment office at all. As expected, coverage rates of registered unem-
ployed (fond) are in all countries higher than coverage rates of all unemployed 
jobseekers (stripes). Denmark – with its highly individualised unemployment sys-
tem that grants benefits independent of means-testing for a long period – fares 
best, and women even have somewhat higher coverage rates than men. In the 
other three countries there are clear differences in coverage levels between men 
and women; if coverage rates of all jobseekers are regarded, the share of women 
covered by unemployment benefits is only half as large as the share of men. 
There are different possible explanations for non-coverage. Besides persons with 
insufficient contribution records, working hours below the hours threshold or earn-
ings below the earnings threshold, this group can also consist of long-term un-
employed persons not in receipt of unemployment assistance benefits due to 
means-testing or of people wishing to return to the labour market after a child-
care break for example. 
Figure 5:  Unemployment receipt for men and women (comparison of  
registered unemployed and all unemployed jobseekers) 
(pooled data for 2000 and 2001) 
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Source: Own calculation based on weighted ECHP data. Low case numbers for registered unem-
ployed in Denmark and in the United Kingdom (male DK: 71, female UK: 57). 
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Average monthly benefit levels expressed in purchasing power parities (PPPs)22 
are highest in Denmark followed by Germany and Spain. The UK with its flat-rate 
benefit system fares worst. Average benefit levels are in all countries somewhat 
higher for men than for women but high gender differences are evident only in 
Spain (compare Table 4). 
Table 4:  Mean benefit levels for men and women in PPPs  
(pooled data for 2000 and 2001) 
 men women 
Denmark 864 845 
Germany 758 708 
Spain 512 379 
United Kingdom 298 278 
Source: Own calculation based on weighted ECHP data. The table refers to unemployment benefit 
recipients with between 3 and 12 months of unemployment. Case numbers for UK women number 
no more than 80 and are thus relatively low. 
When comparing the benefit distribution between men and women, in all coun-
tries except for the United Kingdom, the first quartile, the median and the third 
quartile are lower for women than for men and the distribution is somewhat wider 
for women (compare Figure 6). The distribution of benefits is widest by far in 
Germany which is due to the strong relationship between earnings and benefits 
that is generated by high upper ceilings on earnings. It is narrowest under the Bri-
tish flat-rate benefit system where only age, household constellation and means-
testing lead to variations in benefit levels.  
If average unemployment benefit levels and average former wage levels are 
compared using the ECHP data, it becomes evident that in all countries except 
for Spain net replacement rates of women are higher than those of men (com-
pare Table 5). In general, average net replacement rates are highest in Germany 
and Denmark and lowest in the United Kingdom which operates with flat-rate be-
nefits. 
Gender differences in net replacement rates are largest in Denmark and Ger-
many and non-existent in Spain. This finding suggests that there is some redistri-
bution towards women. Redistribution can take place either through flat-rate 
benefits, the fixation of maximum or minimum benefits or through specific prefer-
ential benefit rules for certain groups such as part-time workers. 
                                            
22  Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) are currency conversion rates that both convert to 
a common currency and equalise the purchasing power of different currencies. In o-
ther words, they eliminate the differences in price levels between countries.  
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Figure 6: Comparison of distribution of monthly benefit levels between men and 
women (pooled data for 2000 and 2001) 
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Source: Own calculation based on weighted ECHP data. The figure refers to unemployment benefit 
recipients with between 3 and 12 months of unemployment. Case numbers for UK women are rela-
tively low (80). 
Table 5:  Net replacement rates for men and women  
(pooled data for 2000 and 2001) 
 men women 
Denmark 49 64 
Germany 51 69 
Spain 41 42 
United Kingdom 19 27 
Source: Own calculation based on ECHP data. The figure shows average unemployment benefits 
(at least one month of unemployment) as share of average net wages.  
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
This section will first look at gender differences in entitlement to benefits by con-
trolling for individual, household and job characteristics. Since lower entitlement 
of women to benefits is not brought about by gender as such but by features built 
into the way benefit systems are designed (means-testing, hours or earnings 
thresholds, and contribution requirements) and that are often disadvantageous to 
women due to their position in the household and in the labour market (character-
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istics of the jobs they are exercising), in a second step, a range of ECHP vari-
ables are transformed so that they reflect regulations of the benefit systems that 
potentially restrict access to benefits.  
Benefit entitlement of women  
Even if we control for part-time work and other individual, household and job cha-
racteristics, women have – except in Denmark – considerably lower odds of re-
ceiving benefits than men (compare Table 6). This points to the importance of 
means-testing in restricting access of women to benefits. In Denmark, with its 
highly individualised unemployment system, the effect on women is not signifi-
cant, whereas in the United Kingdom it is especially great as means-testing sets 
in comparatively early. Former part-time workers, if compared with their full-time 
employed counterparts, have significantly lower odds of receiving benefits in 
Denmark and the United Kingdom (about 1/3rd) as well as in Germany (about 1/2) 
even if factors such as age, household characteristics (composition and income) 
and job-related characteristics (such as former wage) are controlled for. Although 
the coefficient for women is highly significant in Spain, the part-time coefficient for 
Spain is not significant. In fact, the model controls whether individuals have been 
temporarily employed before the onset of unemployment. In Spain, the majority of 
part-time employment is of a temporary nature (Fassler-Ristic, 1999: 371; Ce-
brián et al., 2000: 213) and, as we will see below, the minimum contribution re-
quirement, that is harder to achieve in case of a temporary contract, plays an im-
portant role in Spain in restricting access to benefits. 
Table 6:  Access to unemployment benefits (random effects logistic regression) 
dependent variable: unemploy-
ment benefit receipt (no/yes) Denmark Germany Spain United Kingdom 
                                              odds ratios 
woman 1.56 0.58* 0.43** 0.36* 
last job part-time  0.32** 0.47** 0.80 0.29** 
monthly net wage and salary 
earnings year prior to survey 
1.06** 1.12** 1.07** 1.01 
current net monthly household 
wage/salary income  
0.98 0.94** 0.96** 0.98 
observations 892 2266 4200 588 
number of groups 562 967 2280 417 
wald chi2(35) (Germany(27)) 151.61 301.71 449.22 76.52 
prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
prob >= chibar2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Further variables included in models but not shown here: age, household type, qualification level, 
last job temporary, occupation last job (except for Germany), length of unemployment, and year 
dummies 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: Own calculation based on pooled ECHP data (1995-2001), basis: all unemployed job-
seekers. 
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In Table 7 individual predicted probabilities of benefit receipt are shown in order 
to illustrate the above results and point out the differences between former full-
time and part-time workers. If women with medium qualification levels in couples 
without children, with mean former wage income, mean current household in-
come, and mean length of unemployment (about ten months) are regarded, pre-
dicted probabilities for benefit receipt are in all countries lower for former part-
time than for former full-time workers. For Denmark, for example, we are 95% 
confident that the predicted probability of receiving benefits for former part-time 
workers lies between 0.40 and 0.84 while the predicted probability for former full-
time workers with the same characteristics lies between 0.71 and 0.95. Probabili-
ties to receive benefits are very low for part-time workers in the other three coun-
tries and also remain below 0.30 for former full-time workers with the above 
stated profile (we are looking at registered and non-registered unemployed here).  
Table 7:  Individual predicted probabilities of benefit receipt for typical full-time 
and part-time workers23  
ideal type* Denmark Germany Spain United Kingdom 
 predicted probability (95% confidence interval in brackets) 
part-time women in couple 
without kids 
0.62 
(0.40-0.84) 
0.14 
(0.07-0.20) 
0.23 
(0.15-0.30) 
0.11 
(0.03-0.19) 
full-time women in couple 
without kids 
0.83 
(0.71-0.95) 
0.24 
(0.16-0.32) 
0.27 
(0.20-0.34) 
0.18  
(0.06-0.30) 
Source: Own calculation based on pooled ECHP data (1995-2001), adapted from Long et al. (2006: 
162).  
* Age, former wage, current household income, and length of unemployment are set to their mean;  
  a medium qualification level (ISCED 3) applies. The table refers to all unemployed jobseekers. 
The design of benefit systems and their effects on entitlement 
In this section, some variables of the ECHP data are transformed so that they re-
flect regulations of the countries’ benefit systems that, due to their specific hou-
sehold and labour market position, potentially restrict the access of women to be-
nefits.24  
                                            
23  The regression models on which this table is based do not control for former contract 
type. This is because there is a relatively high level of missing information on both 
former contract type and former working time that leads to a matrix with missing va-
lues – based on this matrix with missing values the individual predicted probabilities 
cannot be calculated. 
24  The existence of a range of specific rules that apply to part-time workers cannot be 
adequately treated in the analysis but they have to be kept in mind when assessing 
the outcomes. Another problem for data analysis is that unemployment insurance re-
gulations are frequently amended – an attractive strategy would be the use of dum-
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The data contains no information on payments of social security contributions. In 
order to capture minimum contribution requirements, the employment infor-
mation from the calendar of events is used. Monthly employment spell informa-
tion is available from January 1993 to December 2000. Since we also know in 
which month a person was interviewed, we can construct a variable that counts 
the number of months during which a specific person was employed before 
his/her last interview.25 Every employment month within a 36-month reference pe-
riod is counted; this corresponds to the Danish and the (pre-reform) German ref-
erence period.26 Since at least three years of previous calendar information are 
necessary to reach the maximum spell length of 36 months, only persons inter-
viewed at the earliest in December 1995 will be able to reach the maximum spell 
length. A similar problem exists for persons interviewed in 2001 and early 2002 
because the calendar of events stops in December 2000.  
Hours or earnings thresholds can be approached by using information on the 
number of hours that an unemployed person worked in his/her last job and on the 
wages earned.27 No retrospective information on working hours is collected in the 
survey. In order to compensate for this problem the information on usual working 
hours from the previous two survey waves is used. The information from t-2 is 
used only if the information on working hours is missing in t-1. Based on the lag-
ged hours, variable four-hour groups are generated: marginal part-time employ-
ment with 1 to 14 hours (the German hours threshold used to be 15 hours, the 
Spanish 12), intermediate part-time employment with 15 to 19 hours, high hours 
part-time work with 20 to 29 hours and full-time employment with more than 30 
hours. The assumption is that discrimination in access to benefits will be stronger 
the lower the working hours.  
Means-testing can be captured by using information on the current household 
income or income of a partner. Here, the current net monthly wage and salary 
household income is used as a proxy for means-testing. 
A random effects logit model is calculated in order to take account of the panel 
structure of the data – responses of the same individual (at different time points) 
                                                                                                                       
mies capturing these changes – but the sample size severely restricts such underta-
kings.  
25  It would have been more correct to use the month the last job was stopped as a ref-
erence point instead of the most recent interview. This was not possible because the-
re is a very high level of missing information – ranging from 25 to 54% – on this vari-
able in all the countries.  
26  The reference period in Spain is even longer (six years), in the United Kingdom the 
two tax years preceding the year the claim is being made are taken into account 
when deciding on a person’s access to benefits based on paid contributions.   
27  Only the yearly individual net wage and salary income from the year prior to the sur-
vey is recorded in the data. In order to get a better proxy of former monthly wage in-
come this amount is divided by the number of months a person has been employed. 
If the yearly wage income is zero for t-1 it is replaced by the information from t-2. 
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are not independent of each other (Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt, 2004: 151ff).28 
Since, in general, the estimated parameters from binary regression models do 
not provide directly useful information for understanding the relationship between 
the independent variables and the outcome, odds ratios, predicted probabilities 
and graphical display of predicted probabilities are used below for the presenta-
tion of results.29  
The following reference categories were chosen: full-time hours (30+) for the 
hours’ threshold indicator, a very long contribution period of 25 to 36 months for 
the indicator on the contribution requirement, and a former net monthly wage of 
more than 1000 Euro-PPP for the earnings threshold indicator. The current 
monthly net wage and salary income of the household that captures means-
testing, and the indicator that captures unemployment duration to control for long-
term unemployment, are metric variables. The models that are calculated sepa-
rately for each country are all significant.30 
Concerning the institutional features that can prevent access to benefits, Table 8 
shows that the hours threshold clearly plays a role in all countries – the odds of 
receiving benefits among people with very low former hours are significantly lo-
wer than the odds of former full-time employees. The odds of receiving benefits 
increase with the number of hours worked. Whereas hours thresholds are (were) 
clearly defined in the German and the Spanish unemployment insurance system, 
they seem to work indirectly also in the British and the Danish systems. In the U-
nited Kingdom this is probably due to the earnings threshold. The proxy variable 
for the earnings threshold in Table 8 indeed points in the right direction but it is 
not significant for the United Kingdom except for zero earnings. In Denmark, the 
strong negative influence of very low hours on access to benefits could either be 
due to the voluntary nature of the unemployment insurance programme – there is 
evidence that people who expect low benefit levels are less likely to insure be-
cause they can expect similar benefit levels from social assistance (Parsons et 
al., 2003). Or it could be due to the fact that minimum contribution requirements 
among part-time workers in Denmark are achieved faster at higher working 
hours.  
                                            
28  The rho statistic displayed at the bottom of Table 8 confirms the use of a random ef-
fects model that takes into account the panel structure of the data. If rho were zero, 
the panel level variance component would be unimportant, and the panel estimator 
would not be different from the pooled estimator (StataCorp 2005). According to the 
likelihood ratio test which formally compares the pooled estimator (logit) with the pa-
nel estimator except for Denmark, the panel estimator is clearly more suitable than 
the pooled estimator. 
29  Long et al. (2006) provide very helpful information on how to use post-estimation 
commands in Stata and on how to present regression outcomes graphically.  
30  The prob>chi2 statistic which is based on the Wald test shows for each country that 
we can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero at the .01 level. 
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Table 8:  How do institutional features of unemployment insurance systems  
influence access to benefits? (random effects logistic regression)  
dependent variable: unemployment 
benefit receipt (no/yes) 
Denmark Germany Spain United Kingdom 
                                                    odds ratios 
REFERENCE: hours threshold: 30+ hours 
hours threshold: 1-14 hours 0.17** 0.32** 0.49** 0.39** 
hours threshold: 15-19 hours 0.47+ 0.35** 0.32** 0.41* 
hours threshold: 20-29 hours 0.71 0.52** 0.43** 0.54+ 
 
REFERENCE: contribution period: 25-36 month 
contribution period: 0 month 0.15** 0.09** 0.11** 0.42* 
contribution period: 1-6 month 0.36** 0.15** 0.11** 0.58+ 
contribution period:  7-12 month 0.49* 0.27** 0.20** 0.61 
contribution period:  13-18 month 0.71 0.31** 0.43** 0.85 
contribution period : 19-24 month 0.71 0.58** 0.68* 0.61+ 
 
household wage/100* (means-
testing) 
0.98+ 0.96** 0.95** 0.98+ 
 
REFERENCE: >1000 € PPP 
earnings threshold proxy: 0 1.91* 0.45** 0.14** 0.34** 
earnings threshold proxy: <300 € 
PPP 
0.44 0.40** 0.12** 0.67 
earnings threshold proxy: <600 € 
PPP 
0.56+ 1.04 0.37** 0.68 
earnings threshold proxy: <1000 € 
PPP 
1.44 1.15 0.99 1.21 
 
unemployment duration proxy 1.09** 1.10** 1.01+ 1.05** 
     
observations 925 4302 4286 1082 
number of groups 674 2761 2837 875 
wald chi2 (14) 89.93 797.35 646.29 84.81 
prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
rho .03 .20 .14 .37 
likelihood ratio test of rho=0: 
prob>=chibar2 
0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: Own calculation based on pooled ECHP data (1994-2001). The sample taken into account 
are all unemployed jobseekers. The Stata command xtlogit is used to fit this model. 
*The household wage and salary income is divided by 100 to facilitate interpretation. 
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Regarding the contribution period, zero months of contributions within the last 
three years clearly restrict the access to benefits in all countries, least so in the 
United Kingdom. In Germany and Spain the odds on receiving benefits signifi-
cantly rise with length of contribution time but always stay below those of people 
with very long contribution periods. The fact that the length of the benefit period 
in both countries depends on the contribution period adds to this outcome. In 
Denmark, the contribution period seems to have a negative influence on benefit 
receipt only if it is shorter than 12 months. The coefficients for the United King-
dom are not significant, which is probably due to the fact that the access to the 
second-tier system, income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance, is conditional on 
means-testing alone and not on the length of previous contribution periods.  
In order to illustrate the effects and interplay of contribution time and hours thres-
holds on benefit entitlement, we can use the above regression results in order to 
create a table of probabilities for ideal types or profiles of people (compare Long 
and Freese, 2006: 160ff). Household income is set to its mean and it is assumed 
that the individuals have formerly earned between 601 and 1000 Euro-PPP a 
month; earnings thresholds should thus not be a problem. Table 9 shows that the 
average probability of all unemployed jobseekers to receive unemployment bene-
fits is 0.62 in Denmark even if they previously worked low hours and have short 
contribution periods. A combination of high working hours (30+) and long contri-
bution periods increases the average probability to about 0.82. The differences in 
the United Kingdom are of a similar magnitude but coverage levels are much lo-
wer – long contribution times and full-time hours lead to predicted probabilities of 
benefit receipt of only about 0.26 (both registered and not registered unemployed 
are regarded). In Germany and Spain, low working hours and short contribution 
periods are clearly problematic in that they dramatically limit access to benefits. 
Unemployed persons with relatively long contribution periods and full-time hours 
have much higher predicted probabilities of benefit receipt than unemployed per-
sons with low hours and short contribution records. In some cases, especially at 
low contribution times in Denmark and in the United Kingdom, the confidence in-
tervals have large ranges.31  
                                            
31  The confidence intervals tell us that we can be 95% confident that the probability of 
receiving benefits lies within the values given in the brackets. 
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Table 9:  Individual predicted probabilities of benefit receipt for ideal types  
Ideal type* Denmark Germany Spain United Kingdom 
dependent variable: unemployment 
benefit receipt 
predicted probability (95% confidence interval in brackets) 
contributions of 7 to 12 months 
and low hours (15-19) 
0.62 
(0.40-0.83)
0.11 
(0.05-0.17)
0.03 
(0.01-0.06)
014 
(0.04-0.24) 
contributions of 13 to 18 months 
and low hours (15-19) 
0.68  
(0.46-0.90)
0.11 
(0.05-0.18)
0.05 
(0.02-0.09)
0.16  
(0.05-0.28) 
contributions of 7 to 12 months 
and high part-time hours (20-29) 
0.71  
(0.56-0.86)
0.14 
(0.10-0.20)
0.04 
(0.03-0.06)
0.16  
(0.06-0.25) 
contributions of 19 to 24 months 
and full-time hours (30+) 
0.82 
(0.71-0.93)
0.38  
(0.30-0.45)
0.17 
(0.13-0.22)
0.26  
(0.16-0.37) 
Source: Own calculation based on pooled ECHP data (1994-2001), based on regression results in 
Table 8. 
* The above results are conditional on a mean household income and wages between 601 and 
1000 Euro-PPP. We look not only at registered unemployed but at all unemployed who are seek-
ing work.  
Reading example: For row one and Denmark: at contribution periods of seven to twelve months, 
part-time hours between 15 and 19, former monthly wages of 601 to 1000 and a mean wage 
household income, the mean probably to receive benefits lies at 0.62. We are 95% confident that 
the probability of receiving benefits lies between 0.40 and 0.83 (compare Long and Freese, 2006: 
160ff). 
Means-testing, introduced into the model via the current household monthly net 
wage and salary income, plays a role in limiting access to benefits (compare Ta-
ble 8). Higher household net wage income is associated with somewhat lower 
odds of receiving unemployment benefits. Since the coefficients are not very in-
formative, Figure 7 highlights the relationship between means-testing and benefit 
receipt for long-term unemployed by showing the predicted probabilities as a 
function of the household wage.32 The idea is to draw a curve showing how the 
model’s prediction of y (unemployment benefit receipt) changes as a function of 
one x variable (household wage income), holding the other variables in the model 
at their mean.  
Means-testing does not play a role in the highly individualised Danish system un-
der which unemployment benefits are paid for a long period regardless of the in-
come situation of the recipient and his/her family, and unemployment assistance 
does not exist. In the other three countries means-testing for long-term unem-
ployed is evident. While it sets in very slowly with growing household wage in-
come in Germany, in Spain it sets in rapidly and in the United Kingdom relatively 
                                            
32  The post-estimation commands (conditional effect plots and individual predicted pro-
babilities) are based on pooled cross-sections (logistic regression that adjusts for re-
peated measurement of the same person); the post-estimation commands used here 
do not work on the panel models. Results of both models are quite close. 
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fast also. In Spain a high household wage income is associated with total aboli-
tion of benefit entitlement, and a similar trend is observable in the United King-
dom if the confidence interval (dashed lines) is taken into account. That this is not 
the case in Germany is probably due to the fact that non-means-tested unem-
ployment insurance benefits were formerly paid for long periods depending on 
age and length of contribution period.  
Figure 7:  Conditional effect plot on the probability of receiving unemployment 
benefits conditional on the current monthly household wage income 
among long-term unemployed  
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Source: Own calculation based on pooled ECHP data (1994-2001), based on regression results in 
Table 8. For description of the method refer to Long et al. (2006: 166-168). All other dependent 
variables from the regression model are set to their mean. 
Reading example: Germany: For long-term unemployed with all other characteristics from Table 8 
at their mean, the predicted probabilities for benefit receipt start at a high of .90 on average at a 
household wage income of zero and then slowly decrease with rising household wage income to 
about .40 on average at a household wage income of €8000. The confidence interval increases 
with rising income.  
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The wage proxy in the regression analysis captures earnings thresholds, and 
indirectly also hours thresholds, since lower hours usually come about with lower 
monthly earnings. Net monthly wage and salary earnings below 300 Euro-PPP in 
the former year imply lower odds of benefit receipt than very high earnings (com-
pare Table 8). Denmark is the only exception – the high and significant coefficient 
on zero earnings could be due to the very long period during which benefits are 
granted in Denmark without being subject to means-testing. The positive coeffi-
cient on zero earnings during the previous two years might thus point simply to 
ongoing benefit receipt that already started some time back. As expected, as 
soon as the wages rise above a certain level, access restrictions are no longer in 
place. Plotting the predicted probabilities of benefit receipt as a function of the 
former wages with all other institutional variables at their mean is more enlighten-
ing than the results from Table 8. Figure 8 shows the predicted probabilities of 
benefit receipt as a function of the former wage level. The level of former wages 
has no influence in Denmark, whereas in the other countries former wages have 
a positive influence on the probability of receiving benefits – the higher the former 
wages the higher the probability of receiving benefits.  
Figure 8:  Conditional effects plot on the probability of receiving  
unemployment benefits conditional on the former wage  
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Source: Own calculation based on pooled ECHP data (1994-2001), based on regression results in 
Table 8. All other dependent variables from the regression model are set to their mean. 
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6 Conclusion  
The gendered division of labour in the family and in society leads to gender strati-
fication in entitlement as workers (Sainsbury, 1996). This is due to differences in 
labour market participation that are reproduced in benefit systems through fea-
tures such as hours or earnings thresholds, minimum contribution periods and 
means-testing.  
While for men standard forms of employment have been the norm in the past 
and, for the majority, remain the norm at present, rising employment rates of wo-
men have entailed increasing part-time employment. In countries that, unlike 
Denmark, do not provide extensive public services, traditional family roles and 
responsibilities of women and men are thus reproduced in the labour market 
through either non-participation (Spain) or involuntary or inevitable part-time em-
ployment of mothers (Germany and the United Kingdom). In this regard, the fact 
that unemployment benefit systems mirror standard employment – admittedly to 
varying degrees – leads to unequal outcomes between men and women.  
The analysis showed that, in order to gain a true picture of benefit coverage and 
gender differences, it is of utmost importance to look at all unemployed job-
seekers and not only at those who are registered at the employment office. To 
look only at coverage rates among the registered unemployed might give a false 
picture of true benefit coverage since people who do not expect any benefit re-
ceipt (for instance due to insufficient contribution records, hours thresholds, or the 
appliance of means-testing) may well decide not to bother registering at the em-
ployment office in the first place. 
In relation to benefit entitlement, women are disadvantaged in all countries ex-
cept Denmark which makes use of highly individualised benefits that are paid for 
a long period and regardless of the household income/income of a partner. In all 
countries but Spain, those women who do have access to benefits have on aver-
age higher net replacement rates than men. In the United Kingdom redistribution 
takes place through flat-rate benefits, while in Denmark low ceilings lead to a sys-
tem that accords higher replacement rates to people with lower former earnings, 
and in Germany special rules are in place; for instance, people who change from 
full-time to part-time employment can receive, for a certain period, unemployment 
insurance benefits corresponding to a share of their former full-time wage.  
Part-time employment seems to be an important reason for lower benefit cover-
age rates among women. The analysis showed that hours and/or earnings 
thresholds play an important role in restricting access to benefits. In the United 
Kingdom this not only takes place directly through the earnings threshold but also 
indirectly in that the contribution-requirement rule takes into account not only con-
tribution periods but also earnings levels. In fact, Bennett (2005), on behalf of the 
British Equal Opportunities Commission, suggests that the contribution rules 
should be re-examined, including the relative speed at which higher-paid as op-
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posed to low-paid workers build up entitlement. In Denmark, part-time employ-
ment has a negative effect on benefit coverage but this does not seem to lead to 
differences in coverage rates between men and women. There are no earnings 
thresholds in Denmark and hours thresholds only work indirectly via the minimum 
contribution requirement. The fact that male part-time workers in Denmark have 
on average considerably lower hours than female part-time workers might con-
tribute to the result that the lower coverage rates of part-time workers do not 
translate into lower coverage rates of women. In Spain, part-time employment 
does not seem to contribute directly to lower unemployment benefit coverage 
rates of women. Instead, minimum contribution requirements represent a problem 
in Spain, where the share of temporary contracts is exceptionally high and part-
time employment (exercised considerably more often by women) in the majority 
of cases goes hand in hand with temporary employment. 
The other important reason for women’s reduced access to benefits is means-
testing. In Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, the (long-term) unemployed 
are less likely to receive unemployment benefits the higher their household wage 
income. Since the household constellation with a full-time working male spouse is 
still much more common than a household constellation with a full-time working 
female spouse, means-testing over proportionally affects long-term unemployed 
women and thus deprives them of an independent replacement income at unem-
ployment.  
Besides modifying the above-discussed features of unemployment insurance 
systems that reproduce gender inequalities, policy measures should be intro-
duced that support a more equal distribution of household and care responsibili-
ties and thus foster equal labour market opportunities for men and women. Here, 
especially the expansion of affordable high-quality child care services has to play 
a role. Some caution is necessary however, for attitudes and practices are 
changing only slowly, and therefore assumptions of complete independence are 
not likely to be advantageous for women. Caring credits, caring allowances, or 
other measures that are targeted at unpaid work for non-employed and peripher-
ally employed persons might have to remain in place, until services have been 
expanded sufficiently.  
It is evident that the security situation of women requires further investigation. 
Questions of financing more encompassing social insurance schemes – in an 
equitable and adequate manner so as to prevent possible incentive problems – 
will have to take centre stage in further investigation.  
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Annex 1 
Table 10:  Longer-term transitions from full-time and part-time employment for 
prime-age (25-55) women  
  t+1 
t  full-time part-time education unempl. inactive 
DK 85.21 6.15 2.20 3.57 2.87 
DE 79.03 6.57 0.84 5.80 7.77 
SP 80.31 4.92 0.11 4.78 9.88 
full-time 
UK 76.10 10.43 0.37 3.21 9.89 
 
DK 35.13 51.74 2.53 6.69 3.90   
DE 25.87 53.57 0.70 5.12   14.74 
SP 36.67 39.16 0.44 5.68 18.05 
part-time 
UK 26.40 51.69 0.46 3.75 17.71 
Source: Own calculation; pooled and weighted ECHP data 1994-2001 (1994?1998, 1995?1999, 
1996?2000, or 1997?2001), employment refers to employment of more than 1 hour. 
Annex 2 
Event history analysis 
Event history methods allow simultaneous analysis of observed and censored 
event times. Life tables are the primary tool for describing event occurrence data. 
They follow the event histories of a sample of individuals from the beginning 
through the end of the data collection and include information on people who are 
eligible to experience the event (risk set), on people who experience the event 
and on people who were censored at the end of the interval (Singer et al. 2003). 
In order to summarise and present the information from the life tables failure 
functions (inverse of the survivor function) can be used. The failure function cu-
mulates period-by-period risks of event occurrence to assess the probability that 
a randomly selected individual will experience the event (Singer et al. 2003). The 
estimated failure function provides maximum likelihood estimates of the probabil-
ity that an individual randomly selected from the population will fail (make an exit 
from employment). There will be a difference between the percentage of workers 
that is still employed (not necessarily by the same employer) at the end of the da-
ta collection and the estimate of the percentage of workers that is still employed – 
this is exactly because censoring is adjusted for (estimation is done indirectly via 
the individuals who remain in the risk set). Under the assumption of independent 
censoring, one can thus use the risk set to estimate what would have happened 
to the entire remaining population had there been no censoring. The results 
might be somewhat distorted by the fact that many interviewed people were al-
ready employed at the start of the survey and we do not know the real length of 
their employment spell (left censoring).  
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